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         Abstract
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the electoral umpire responsible 
for the conduct of general elections in Nigeria and other related electoral activities since the 
resurgence of democratic rule in 1999. One of these important electoral activities carried 
out by INEC is campaign monitoring and political party financing activities as provided in 
the Nigerian Constitution and the 2010 Electoral Act. This paper examined the role of INEC 
in monitoring candidates and parties’ expenditure during the 2015 General Elections. The 
major problem was the way parties and candidates violated the regulations while INEC 
as the monitoring body was watchful without any concrete action. The paper used the 
qualitative method of data collection and analysis where the researchers went to the field 
and consulted informants in the affected agencies and individuals through interviews and 
Focus Group Discussions. The data obtained from the field was analysed using tables and 
other techniques of qualitative data analysis. The paper concludes that, politicians and their 
political parties spent above the campaign spending limits as provided by law in the 2015 
General Elections and the electoral body (INEC) did not monitor properly the campaign 
spending due to lack of political will from policy-makers and loopholes in the law that 
empowered them to monitor the spending. The research recommends that for proper and 
effective campaign financing monitoring in future elections, INEC should be mandated to 
monitor all politicians and their activities during and after elections, the anti-graft agency 
(EFCC) should be involved in screening candidates while the Code of Conduct Bureau 
should be reinforced in watching public servants’ assets.
Keywords: INEC, political party, election, campaign, political financing, regulations.
Introduction
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the body responsible for the 
conduct of general elections in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (from 1999 to date). It was 
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established by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution as amended and it has successfully 
conducted five consecutive successful general elections.  INEC has constitutional powers and 
the Electoral Act 2010 mandates the Commission to undertake responsibilities of conducting 
elections and registration as well as monitoring political parties and their activities. Political 
party financing is a difficult task to monitor and regulate even in advanced democracies as 
a result of the allegations of corrupt practices involved and the absence of a strong legal 
mechanism for the monitoring. The Department that is responsible for monitoring and 
auditing political parties during general elections was introduced in 2010 and it has been 
in operation for the two previous elections in 2011 and 2015. This is a research work is on 
the role and effectiveness or otherwise of INEC in monitoring political parties’ campaign 
expenditure during the 2015 General Elections.
There are well-provided rules and regulations in the Constitution and the 2010 Electoral 
Act which clearly articulate the legal means and procedures for party funding including 
its maximum spending limit, auditing and other related issues. INEC is empowered 
constitutionally to regulate such expenditure and monitor party activities during elections. 
However, despite its constitutional powers, INEC could not monitor effectively and 
regulate political party financing during the 2015 General Elections as a result of the lack of 
political willingness and the dubious nature of politicians’ manipulation of the process. This 
led to excessive campaign spending, which was unprecedented in the history of Nigeria’s 
elections, by the two major political parties; All Progressive Congress (APC) and Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP), above the set spending limit. While there are some studies on 
this subject matter, little or no attention is given to the specific role of INEC in campaign 
financing monitoring. The existing works emphasized mostly on political party financing by 
godfathers and the corruption in the process. This is the area of research contribution that 
this paper fulfills.
The major objectives of the paper are categorised into two: (a) to examine the provisions 
on regulations in political party financing in Nigeria during the 2015 General Elections and 
the powers of INEC in monitoring the financing and (b) to analyse whether INEC was able 
to monitor the campaign spending as empowered by the Constitution and the extent of the 
monitoring or its success.
Methodology And Analysis
The paper used the qualitative method of data collection and analysis. Qualitative data 
analysis is a paradigm of research work which involves the use of meanings and words for 
data collection and their interpretation. It is used in both primary and secondary sources 
for research in a qualitative way suitable for the research in question and the environment 
of the research. Qualitative research is not about data and techniques only. It is also about 
the application of qualitative strategies for qualitative paradigms. It involves the utilisation 
of the spoken and written words, understanding and interpretating meanings, generating a 
narrow rich data and the exploration of deeper analysis within a given context of meanings.15
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This research was a case study of the qualitative method type where the 2015 General 
Elections were taken as the specific case of analysis. It was an evaluation and an in-depth 
analysis of a specific event that took place within a specific period and time and it was a 
particular case study because it focused on a particular event or a phenomenon which was 
the 2015 General Elections.
The research used primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source was in-depth 
personal interviews with selected informants. Some informants were selected from certain 
categories including politicians, party stakeholders, INEC senior officials, academicians 
and electorates. For the politicians’ part, some serving elected officers and contestants 
at both the national and local levels were interviewed. National party executives of four 
selected major parties were interviewed including APC, DPP, PDP and SDP. Some INEC 
senior national officials were interviewed while academic experts in the area of study were 
consulted for the interview and interviewers were selected in Abuja from members of the 
Civil Society Situation Room who helped in the monitoring of elections during the 2015 
General Elections. 
The research also used documented primary sources such as reports from governmental 
publications and international organisations and agencies including the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the United Kingdom Agency for International Development (UKAID), the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), the Centre for Public Policy Alternative (CPPA), the Nigerian 
1999 Constitution, the Electoral Act 2010 and other documents. In addition, the research 
used secondary sources which consisted of the existing literature in the area of study from 
books, journals, articles and Internet sources.
The data obtained from the field was analysed through the use of themes that were 
interpreted from the words of the informants in relation to the existing knowledge in the 
field for analysis. The results arrived at were discussed and interpreted for findings and 
future recommendations.
Literature Review
In this section, an attempt was made to examine the various scholastic views and other 
related documents on the subject matter of the study for critical reviews and identification of 
the area of contribution of the paper to knowledge. This section is divided into sub-sections 
under themes for analytical purpose.
The Independent National Electoral Commission 
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the national electoral body in 
Nigeria which is responsible for the overall supervision and conduct of general elections in 
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the country including other related procedures such as registration of voters, delineation of 
constituencies, setting dates for conducting for elections, registration and de-registration of 
political parties as well as supervision and monitoring of political parties and regulations 
of campaign activities and elections. It was established in 1999 with the resurgence of 
democratic rule in Nigeria after more than a decade of military rule. As a result of the failure 
of the previous electoral umpires, INEC was in the beginning established to be independent 
and transparent according to the Constitutional clause that established the Commission.
The Establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission 
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established by the Nigerian 
military in 1998 under Decree No 17 of 1998. On 5th August 1998, the Commission was 
passed into law where it was stated that:
“The Federal Military Government hereby decrees as follows: There should 
be a body known as the Independent National Electoral Commission to be 
referred to according to this Decree as the “Commission.” The Commission 
shall be a body that is corporate with perpetual succession, and may sue and be 
sued in its corporate name”.
The Decree later became famously known as the Independent National Electoral Commission 
Establishment  Decree 1998. 
The origin of electoral commissions in Nigeria started from the colonial period when the 
Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) was established to conduct the 19 
59 General Elections that led to the ushering of political independence. The entire First 
Republic (1960-1966) elections were conducted by ECN. The ECN was dissolved after the 
first military coup in 1966. In 1978, a new electoral commission was established named 
the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) by the military regime to conduct the 1979 
General Elections. The FEDECO remained the electoral umpire in the country until after 
the military coup of 1983 which ended the Second Republic (1979-1983) in Nigeria and 
introduced another military rule for many decades (INEC, 2017).
In 1990, the Military Regime of General Ibrahim Babangida established the National 
Electoral Commission (NEC) which conducted the controversial June 12, 1991 Presidential 
Election that was annulled by the same Military Regime leading to the emergence of what 
was called the “Aborted Third Republic” in Nigerian political history. The Military Regime 
of General Sani Abacha dissolved NEC and established the National Electoral Commission 
(NECON) in an attempt for another civilian rule that failed before the actualisation as a 
result of the eventual death of  General Sani Abacha.
In 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s Military Administration dissolved NECON and 
introduced the decree that led to the establishment of INEC as the current electoral body 
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in the Fourth Republic (1999-date). On realizing the state’s domination and control of the 
electoral umpire and politicization of the body, the decree sought to make the Commission 
independent in structure and in terms of financing as the name implied. However, INEC was 
far from being independent in terms of the conduct of elections particularly the 2003 and 
2007 General Elections which were bedeviled with huge outcries of rigging and irregularities 
at both the local and international levels. The reasons behind such a negative phenomenon 
are explained in later sections.
Powers and Functions of the Independent National Electoral Commission 
Section 225 Sub-sections 1-6 and Section 226 Sub-sections 1-3 of the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution empower INEC to monitor and supervise all electoral and financial activities of 
political parties and their members according to its periodic discretion. In addition, Section 
88 and its Sub-sections of the 2010 Electoral Act empower INEC to monitor and sanction 
parties financially in terms of its income and expenditure. Section 91 Sub-sections 1-7 
empower INEC to set limits to maximum campaign spending for various elective offices 
at the federal, state and local levels and Section 92 Subsections 1-7 provide for INEC to 
sanction any party or person that violates the provisions of Section 91. Other Sections in 
the Electoral Act 2010 empower INEC to monitor and regulate all activities and finances 
of political parties and candidates that contest for any elective office. Thus, the above legal 
provisions bestowed much power on INEC over political parties and contestants but the 
problem was whether such powers were efficiently utilized or not. 
INEC was expected, according to the decree that established it, to perform the following 
functions:
1. Organise, conduct and supervise all elections and matters pertaining to elections to, 
all the elective offices provided in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999 as amended or any other enactment or law;
2. Register political parties in accordance with the provision of the relevant enactment 
or law;
3. Monitor the organisation and operation of the political parties including their finances;
4. Arrange for the annual examination of and auditing of the funds and accounts of 
the political parties and publish reports on such examination and audit for public 
information;
5. Conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and the preparation, maintenance 
and revision of the register of voters for the purpose of any election;
6. Monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the 
political parties;
7. Ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers take and 
subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by law;
8. Delegate any of its powers to any State Resident Electoral Commissioner and 
carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by a decree or any other 
enactment or law.
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The above functions have been undertaken by INEC since 1999 although some might not 
have taken place or were dismal in terms of implementation. One can simply conclude in 
this section that if the rules are fully operated and INEC is really independent, it has all 
the powers to sanction a fair and credible election in Nigeria, but why is it that always 
the elections are followed with lamentations of lack of credibility and series of litigation? 
Further examination in the other sections of this paper will reveal why. 
Organisational Structure of INEC
Figure 1. Organisational Chart of Independent National Electoral Commission.
Source. Designed by the Researchers 2017.
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The Independent National Electoral Commission is headed by the Executive Chairman 
who is appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria after approval by 
the National Assembly. There are 12 National Commissioners with 2 drawn from each 
of the six geo-political zones (North-west, North-east, North-central, South-west, South-
east and South-south). The Commission comprises of seven (7) departments and thirteen 
(13) outstanding committees and state offices in the 36 states headed by a coordinator. 
The above explanation is presented in a chart for clarity of expression and conveniency of 
understanding. 
Independent National Electoral Commission and the Challenges of Election Conduct 
in Nigeria
INEC as the national electoral body has conducted five consecutive general elections, 
more than any other electoral body in the history of the country. The elections that were 
conducted by INEC took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 2011 and 2015, and that of 2019 fast 
approaching. In the process of the conduct of elections, INEC usually prepares ahead, 
designes the electoral budget and submits it to the Presidency which in return presents 
it to the National Assembly for scrutiny and questions as well as approval. For instance, 
the 2015 General Elections was seen as the most expensive in the history of Africa with a 
whopping sum of N125 billion  ($340, 863, 696.382 million) approved by the government 
for the INEC to conduct the elections and that amount has never been spent in the history 
of elections in Africa.
After the conduct of the 2007 General Elections, many analysts concluded that the elections 
that were conducted by the military during the transition to democratic rule were far better 
organised and credible than that of the INEC under civilian rule. Why? This was because 
of the intricacies of the processes and performances as well as the outcome of the elections 
which left much to be desired. For instance, the Human Rights Watch reported in 2007 
that the 2003 and 2007 General Elections were not far from being broad daylight robbery 
and the mockery of elections and democracy. The report further argued that there was vote 
buying, ballot stealing, ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters, violence, massive riggings 
and alteration of results openly in the electoral process. The Observer Book of Scandal 
(2010) also attested to the above position where it cited that the 2007 General Elections in 
Nigeria was the third most controversial election in the history of this world according to 
their records.
 
Even though in some instances INEC was found to be a complementary factor in the 
irregularities and malpractices that took place in the electoral process in Nigeria, the entire 
process was hijacked and subverted by the politicians who overpowered all efforts put in 
by INEC in making the elections presentable and credible as well as acceptable. Politicians 
turned politics into war and strove to win at all costs using all forms of manipulative 
activities such as vote buying, excessive spending above the set limit, hiring thugs, rigging 
and other forms of corrupt practices in the electoral process. In the real sense of it, while 
Babayo Sule, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani & Bakri Mat
22
there might be dubious and corrupt behaviour from the INEC in the conduct of general 
elections in Nigeria, the activities and attitudes of politicians made it extremely difficult for 
INEC to have the freedom of conducting a credible and acceptable election at the national 
and international levels.
However, fortunately, in the 2015 General Elections, INEC under the leadership of a 
reputable Professor of Political Science, Attahiru Mohammed Jega, succeeded in conducting 
an election that was seen as credible and fair, unprecedented in the history of the Nigerian 
Fourth Republic. Perhaps, some of the factors that contributed to the success of INEC in 
conducting a credible election in 2015 were the introduction of card readers for electronic 
voting which drastically curbed rigging and other irregularities in addition to the emergence 
of a strong opposition party, APC which squarely challenged PDP in the polls. Other issues 
that contributed to the success of the elections included the insecurity issue, corruption, 
poverty, unemployment and the desire of Nigerians to do away with the sixteen (16) 
wasteful years of PDP rule.
The 2015 General Elections
The 2015 General Elections is still judged as the most credible in the Fourth Republic or 
at least one of the most fair and credible in the history of Nigeria. This is the result of the 
new trend that emerged from the elections and the entire process of conducting the elections 
in general. Apart from the use of smart card readers and the transparency in the process 
with the electoral body (INEC) offering a platform for equal treatment of the parties and 
contestants, it was the first time in the history of Nigeria that an opposition party wrested 
power from the ruling party since political independence in 1960. 
The elections were keenly and closely fought out by two major parties; the ruling PDP 
and the opposition party APC, which turned into another equation-the ruling APC and the 
opposition PDP after the-2015 General Elections. There were controversies, fears, intense 
campaigns, alliances and re-alliances before the elections. Excessive money that was used 
by both the ruling PDP and the opposition APC  was mostly looted money from the public 
purse. At last, the elections, contrary to what many Nigerians and international analysts 
predicted, turned out to be a peaceful transfer of power in a credible and fair process.
The overall conduct of the elections was commendable. INEC succeeded in establishing 
an improved process of the elections in terms of voter registration, transparent display of 
voters’ list, exhibition of clear rules and regulations for the parties and the contestants, 
direct involvement of civil societies and international observer groups, and  the elections 
itself which was free of much violence and rigging unlike the previous ones before it.
The 2015 General Elections indicated that the APC emerged with landslide victories in the 
Presidential, Governorship and National Assembly (Senate and Members of the House of 
Representatives) elections. This is presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3




2015 Presidential Elections Results in Nigeria
Candidate Party Votes Percentage
Muhammadu Buhari APC 15, 424, 921 53.96 %
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan PDP 12, 853, 162 44.96 %
Adebayo Ayeni APA      53,537 0.19 %
Ganiyu Galadima ACPN      40, 311 0.14 %
Sam Eke CPP      36, 300 0.13 %
Rufus Salau AD      30, 637 0.11 %
Mani Ahmad ADC      29, 665 0.10.%
Allagoa Chinedu PPN      24, 475 0.09 %
Martin Onovo NCP      24, 455 0.09 %
Tunde Anifowose Kilani AA      22, 125 0.08 %
Chekwas Okorie UPP      18, 220 0.06 % 
Comfort Sonaiya KP      13, 037 0.0 5%
Godson Okoye UDP        9, 208 0.03% 
Ambrose Albert Owuru HP        7, 435 0.03 %
Invalid votes All Parties     844, 519 -
Total 14 Parties 29, 432, 849 100 %
Registered voters 67, 422, 005 100 %
Source. INEC 2015.
Table 2
2015 Governorship Elections Results
Party Seats Percentage
APC 19 61.29 %
PDP 12 38.71 %
Total 31 100 %
Source: INEC 2015.
The above results indicate that the state Governorship elections took place in 31 of the 36 
states in the country as the dates for elections in other states differed. The newly ruling party 
APC won 19 out of 31 or 61.29 % of the seats while PDP won 12 or 38.71% of the seats. 
Seats were also won by APGA Anambra and Osun controlled by APC, the Ondo Labour 
Party, Edo APC and Bayelsa PDP which made a total of 36 states if added together. In total, 
APC controlled 21 states (58.33%), PDP had 13 seats (36.11 %) with APGA and the Labour 
Party each controlled 1 seat (2.78%).
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Table 3
2015 National Assembly Elections Senate
Party Seats Percentage
APC 60 55.05 %
PDP 49 44.95 %





APC 225 62.5 %
PDP 125 34.72 %
Other Parties 10 2.78 %
Total 360 100 %
Source. INEC 2015
In conclusion, the 2015 General Elections was an improvement from the previous ones and 
had set the foundation for better political socialisation, voting behaviour and democratic 
consolidation in Nigeria, and Africa at large. It would go a long way in fostering more 
improvements in future elections as it is evident that the recent National Assembly’s 
approval of the use of card readers permanently for accreditation and voting will further 
minimise rigging and other electoral irregularities. It has also influenced many African 
countries to change their ruling governments in neighbouring Ghana, Gambia, Somalia and 
other elections like the currently ongoing Liberian and Kenyan elections. 
The only annoying issue in the 2015 General Elections was money politics where money 
was spent crazily above the set limit by the major contending parties. There are speculations 
of spending of trillions of naira and even revelation of corrupt practices like the diversion 
of the $2.1 billion meant for procurement of weapons to fight Boko Haram insurgency in 
Northeastern Nigeria which the then National Security Adviser to former President Jonathan 
shared the money among politicians, party stakeholders, religious clerics, traditional rulers, 
bureaucrats, electoral body officials, voters and all segments of the country that were related 
to the election in the country.  This is one area that INEC lost control in the elections. 
Hence it must pay greater attention in addressing it in the 2019 General Elections, otherwise 
politicians with huge financial muscle will continue to determine the direction of the polity 
and influence who will contest or not and possibly the winner.
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Theoretical Framework: Structural Functionalism
This work adopted the theory of structural functionalism to explain the process of elections 
conducted by INEC between the constitutional powers and the Electoral Act that the 
Commission had and the actual field activities that the INEC was really doing in practice. 
The origin, basic assumptions, criticisms and application of the theory within the context of 
this work are explained below.
Origin of the Theory
The term structural functionalism originates from Aristotle’s study of the ultimate causes in 
the nature or the actions in relation to their ends or utility. The second phase of the theory 
was developed by the French philosopher Baron De Montesquieu in the 17th century in his 
doctrine of separation of powers based on the notion of functions that are best undertaken 
separate from each other as a means of ensuring stability and security. Functionalism became 
important when Darwin’s Theory of Evolution began to influence the thinking about human 
behaviour. 
In sociological discourse, structural functionalism has root in the works of Durkheim, Parsons 
(1951) and Merton (1968). The above scholastic ideas became central to the emergence of 
the theory in modern social sciences. The ideas were later adopted and advanced by political 
scientists Almond & Coleman, 1960).34a Emile Durkheim in the 19th century believed that 
societies were made of fragmented blocks that needed to work together for the entire society 
to function together (Durkheim, 1893). Durkheim (1893) further emphasized that societal 
bonds must work perfectly otherwise the society would disintegrate. Thus, since the mid-
20th century, structural functionalism has become one of the most frequently applied theories 
in the area of social science particularly sociology and political science which was further 
advanced by Almond and Coleman (1960).
Basic Assumptions
Succinctly, structural functionalism has the following basic major assumptions. One of 
the major assumptions is that society has fragments of structures and their functions work 
independently and inter-dependently. Thus, there is a clear difference between the ideal 
function of any organization or societal component and its real function in the society. 
The second assumption is, there is a relation between a political structure and its function 
and it may be influenced by certain factors in its function or malfunctioning. The third 
assumption is, society or the political system should be studied using the real function it 
is performing and not the proposed or ideal function which may not be applicable in some 
given conditions. Furthermore, the theory suggests that the political system or the nature of 
a society determines the structure and functions of organisations and their systems and sub-
systems. For example, an advanced democratic society might have a better structure that 
functions accordingly than a backward democratic or developing democracies.
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Criticisms of the Theory
Critics of structural functionalism view it as a translation of the Anglo-American political 
norms in methodological terminology.30c Structural functionalism may be on the decline as 
a methodological and theoretical approach for the study of politics. However, the theory 
may not go down easily as it will leave a set of terms that are still used in political jargons.30d 
Another criticism of structural functionalism is that its categories were too undifferentiated 
to be of real help in actual research.  Also, the theory was criticised on the ground that 
it harbours ideological slogans of the liberal political scientists, especially American 
Behaviouralists that portrayed their methodology as scientific and value free. In other 
words, it was also value laden in nature and approach.
Applicability of the Theory in Research Work
Four approaches are useful in determining the applicability of structural functionalism. 
They are process, content, function and form. The processes of the government are 
elaborately different, discrete and easy to identify in developed countries but in simpler 
societies the same processes are rarely differentiated and discrete. The content and process 
are interdependent and derivative.
In essence, taking the environment of our study and the organisation (INEC) as well as its 
functions it is easy to apply this theory using the methods of its applicability by portraying the 
fact that Nigeria is categorized, based on this theory, as a simple or developing democracy 
where the processes of government are not clearly differentiated. An institution such as 
INEC which supervises the conduct of elections and political parties’ activities has no clear 
distinguished processes between the process and the content. It is evident that the powers 
and functions of INEC are clearly identified in this work and explained unambiguously, but 
the problem is the applicability of the process within the content and form of its institutional 
reality. This is where the theory explains the topic of the study. In other words, there is no 
clear diversification between the structure and the function in the case of INEC and its role 
of monitoring campaign finances in the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria because the level 
of democratic play was still low.
Discussion of Results and Findings
There are well articulated Constitutional provisions and the 2010 Electoral Act that 
empowers INEC to monitor and set limits for campaign spending and other activities of 
INEC and sanction them if they defaulted. Section 225(1-6) and Section 226(1-3) state 
clearly the powers that INEC had in the Nigerian 1999 Constitution in setting the limit 
for political parties on what to spend during campaigning, auditing and monitoring their 
sources of finances, assets and expenditures as well as liabilities and other matters related 
to it.
Independent National Electoral Commission and Campaign Financing Monitoring in Nigeria: The 2015 
General Elections
27
Furthermore, the 2010 Electoral Act provides INEC the powers in Section 91(1-7) to set the 
limit for maximum campaign spending of various elective offices as follows. 
Table 5
Spending Limits of Candidates According to 2010 Electoral Act
Position Spending limit
Presidential candidate N1Billion ($3, 183, 870.91)
Governorship candidate N200Million($636, 774.18)
Senatorial candidate N40Million  ($127, 354.84)
Member of Federal House of Representatives N20Million  ($63, 677.42)
State House of Assembly Members N10Million  ($31, 838.71)
L G Chairmanship candidate N10Million  ($31, 838.71)
L G Councillorship Elections N1, 000,000 ($3, 183.871)
Source. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act 2010 as amended (the conversion into USD was made by 
the researcher).
Having realised the intensity of the need to adhere strictly to the above provisions, the 
Electoral Act further provides INEC with powers to sanction defaulters of the above limit 
as follows.
Table 6
Sanctions of Violaters of Maximum Campaign Spending in 2010 Electoral Act.
Position Sanction
Presidential candidate A fine of N1, 000, 000=$2, 747.060) or imprisonment of 12 months or both.
Governorship candidate A fine of N800, 000=$2, 197.10) or imprisonment of 9 months or both.
Senatorial candidate A fine of N600, 000=$1, 647.93) or imprisonment of six months or both.
House of Representatives A fine of N500, 000=$1, 373.3) or imprisonment of five months or both.
State House of Assembly A fine of N300, 000=$824.042) or 3 months imprisonment or both.
Chairman Local Council A fine of N300, 000=$824.042) or 3 months imprisonment or both.
Councillor Local Council A fine of N100, 000.00=$274.697) or 1 month imprisonment or both.
Source. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act 2010 as amended (the conversion into USD was made by 
the researcher).
Apart from the maximum campaign spending limit and the sanction for violators, other 
Sections in the Electoral Act 2010 also empower INEC to monitor finances of political 
parties, regulate their assets and liabilities, their sources of income and expenditure in 
Sections 88(1-2), 89(1-4) and 91(1).
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However, recent revelations indicated that INEC was not able to monitor properly or rather 
apply the provisions in terms of limiting the campaign spending to the set limit and its 
discovery also did not in any way ginger INEC into the action of sanctioning the offenders. 
It might be for the simple reason that either INEC was not willing to sanction the offenders 
or it was overpowered by the politicians and the lack of political will from the policy-makers 
to allow the rules to prevail irrespective of who was affected in the process. This is exactly 
what structural functionalism explained in terms of the relationship and operation of the 
structure and function in developing democracies. For example, a study by USAID/UKAID 
(2015) disclosed that despite the maximum total campaign spending limit of N1Billion ($3, 
183, 870. 91) for a Presidential candidate, the campaign expenses of APC and PDP in media 
advertisement alone exceeded the maximum spending limit as shown in Table 7.
Table 7
Media Spending of Two Major Political Parties in the 2015 General Elections: APC and 
PDP
Campaign expenses PDP Presidential candidate APC Presidential candidate
Campaigns and rallies 1, 280, 374, 870.00 671, 062, 200.00
Expenses on billboards     473, 160, 000.00 190, 380, 000.00
Electronic media campaign       532, 100, 000.00 410, 050,   000.00
Electronic media advert     3, 988, 822, 125.00 1, 064, 706, 805.00
Print media campaign     2, 475, 228, 301.00   5 79, 647, 687.00
TOTAL     8, 749, 685, 296.00 2, 915, 846, 737.00
Source. USAID & UKAID, 2015.
In addition to the above, other revelations disclosed that the extent of campaign spending 
in the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria had reached trillions of naira by the two major 
contending parties, APC and PDP, such as in the case of Colonel Sambo Dasuki who 
diverted $2.1 billion meant for the purchase of weapons to fight the Boko Haram insurgency. 
It was channeled into the campaign spending spree of the PDP re-election where security 
chiefs, party stakeholders, politicians, bureaucrats, religious clerics, traditional rulers, civil 
societies, INEC officials, voters and all stakeholders  involved in the process of the 2015 
General Elections were bribed. 
Perhaps, INEC failed to monitor effectively the excessive campaign spending of the major 
political parties because of corruption that some of its officials were involved in corruption. 
A recent investigation jointly undertaken by EFCC and INEC, revealed that some INEC 
officials were involved in the bribery scandal. The former Minister of Petroleum, Mrs. 
Diezani Allison Maduekwe, gave N23 billion ($63, 822, 813.191 million) to some INEC 
officials, numbering 223 across the 36 States of the Federation and Federal Capital Territory 
Abuja, to skew the results of the 2015 General Elections in favour of the ruling PDP. The 
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case is still under investigation. Although the INEC officials are constitutionally empowered 
by law to monitor and forward recommendations for the sanction of offenders, the level of 
monitoring was weak and ineffective. 
However, there are some views from the informants consulted in this work that INEC 
had improved and recorded some success in terms of the monitoring of political parties 
and politicians’ campaign activities including spending as well as the overall conduct of 
the elections. It was only concerned with the fact that the corrupt practices that had been 
instituted for a long period of time cannot be undone in just a short period of time; it must be 
gradual and in this aspect, INEC has been improving and setting some measures to curb the 
violation of electoral rules such as the introduction of the card reader which gave impetus 
for the credibility of the elections and drastically minimized the rigging of election results.
Other informants believed that INEC was not really operating as it should and it had failed to 
monitor the activities and expenditures of parties and politicians because it is a branch of the 
government which derives its sources of operation and emoluments from the government. 
Hence, although the ruling APC and the opposition PDP were involved in the violation of 
the electoral rules in terms of excessive spending, the matter was not investigated by INEC 
and it was allowed to die a natural death. However, the INEC officials that were involved 
in the bribery scandal were under investigation and punishment. This simply means the 
mighty escaped the law comfortably while the weaker ones were trapped.
Conclusion and Recommendation
The paper concludes that INEC, in its own capacity alone, cannot curb the violation of 
electoral rules especially in the monitoring of campaign spending of political parties and 
candidates. This is because although the rules are well elaborated in the Constitution and the 
Electoral Act which empower INEC to do so, it is failing to do its job because of the dubious 
nature of the politicians and their powers in subverting regulations to suit their personal 
interests. The paper also concludes that, INEC has put in more effort and has tried its best 
in the monitoring process within its capacity but it was limited by corruption from both the 
ruling class and some of its officials. Also, the paper concludes that, the act of monitoring 
campaign expenditure should not be in the hands of INEC alone. Other stakeholders need to 
be involved such as civil societies, anti-graft agencies and the general public. Based on the 
above conclusion, the paper recommends the following for future action:
1. INEC should be empowered constitutionally and made more independent by making 
its sources of funds to emerge directly from the consolidated revenue or the Federation 
account which will minimise its dependency on the executive for statutory allocations 
and lawmakers for approval. It will enable an independent INEC to discharge its 
duties freely without any favour;
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2. The maximum spending limit for elective offices stipulated in the 2010 Electoral 
Act should be revisited upward especially at the top levels considering the nature of 
Nigerian politics where money played an influential role in the entire process because 
the current limit going by the inflationary trend in the country is  not realizable;
3. Those who are caught in the act of bribery from both the INEC officials and the 
government officials must be severely punished and the parties should be sanctioned 
by applying Section 92(1-7) on any violator of the rules;
4. There should be involvement of the anti-graft agencies; EFCC and ICPC, in the 
screening of candidates and monitoring of campaign spending alongside the INEC 
for a better collaboration;
5. Civil societies need to expand their work of civic voter education and consultation 
with INEC to include monitoring and whistle blowing of excessive spending of 
parties and candidates to the INEC and the public, and
6. There is a need for a strong political will from the policy-makers in allowing INEC 
the free hand to monitor and sanction offenders without politicising the process.
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